Introduction
There is a growing recognition among policy makers that in order to make informed decisions, consumers of health care services need to possess information on both prices and quality. Similarly insurers and large group purchasers require information on quality and performance in order to negotiate prices with providers in their networks.
Interest in this issue has prompted CMS to develop the Hospital Compare web site. As of April 2005 this site provided consumers with quality indicators for major medical conditions, in approximately 4,700 acute care community hospitals. The featured medical conditions were heart attacks (acute myocardial infarction), heart failure, and pneumonia; quality indicators were based on process of care measures associated with each of these conditions 1 . Due to the difficulty in interpreting over 30 disparate process measures and a greater emphasis on outcome-based measures in policy discourse, CMS began to report post-discharge hospital mortality rates for these conditions beginning in
2008. In 2009 CMS also began to report Medicare allowed charges for related procedures. However, these charges reflect mostly fixed rates paid to hospitals for treating Medicare beneficiaries, and apply to broad diagnostic categories used in the Medicare payment formula; they do not necessarily reflect actual hospital prices in the private segment of the market.
While these reporting systems represent progress, consumer confusion over 'fair' pricing continues to be widespread, particularly in private markets for hospital services 4 (Reinhardt, 2006; RWJF, 2013) . Anecdotal press accounts often tell of individual consumers able to negotiate price discounts from hospitals using information gleaned from Hospital Compare and similar state based reporting systems, while consumeroriented internet sites and blogs appear to reflect frustration over the lack of information regarding costly procedures left out of the published lists 2 . Most recently, a broader release of the CMS charge data has garnered substantial media attention, but its applicability to privately insured segment of the market remains contestable (Meier et al., 2013) . A related issue of interest is the association between hospital performance measures and prices. While price transparency is intended to inject price competition overall (Ginsburg, 2007; GAO, 2011) , it has been suggested that higher performing hospitals may be able to command higher prices if prices are negotiated with wellinformed insurers (Cutler and Dafny, 2011) .
In this study we focus on the example of colorectal cancer, and the inpatient surgical procedure associated with it, colon resection. We have two objectives. First, we examine the distribution of prices in the private segment of the market. Second, we assess the association between hospital performance and prices using a mortality-based outcome measure similar to that found in hospital report cards such as Hospital Compare. Note 2 Related to the procedure of main interest in this study, colon resection (also referred to as colectomy), an anxious patient asks, without getting a definitive reply: "…Please can someone give me a ballpark figure on how much the surgery to remove a tumor in the lower part of the colon would run? I need to know because I want to raise money because we currently don't have health coverage….", www.healthboards.com (accessed 4/30/11).
5 that we rely on transaction prices, namely actual payments made to hospitals by third party payers 3 (Capps and Dranove, 2004; .
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background and context on colorectal cancer and related procedures. Section 3 describes data sources and estimating sample. Section 4 lays out the conceptual framework, including specification of our price models, definition of our mortality-based hospital performance measure, and simple theoretical motivation. The results are discussed in section 5, followed by conclusions in section 6. In the Appendix, construction of the hospital performance measures is explained in greater detail.
Colorectal Cancer
In the U. S., colorectal cancer accounts for approximately 147,000 cases and almost 50,000 deaths annually, making it the second leading cause of death among all cancers, following lung cancer. Treatment usually involves surgical removal of the affected portion of the colon (resection), with the type and extent of resection dependent on the location of the tumor. Other than the importance of colon cancer nationally, we chose to focus our analysis on colon cancer for two reasons. First, this surgery is performed on an inpatient basis only; in contrast to surgeries for other common cancers 6 such as breast cancer for which surgeries may be performed on an outpatient basis as well. Second, in the case of colorectal cancer, there is no discretionary choice of therapy so all patients receive surgery treatment, unlike the example of prostate cancer where surgery and radiation are equally viable alternatives (Jacobson et al., 2010) .
Consequently, the price of colorectal surgery is more clearly defined and identifiable in insurance claims databases. Variants of the procedure include total surgery, in which the entire colon is removed, partial surgery, in which an incision is made to remove part of the colon, and less invasive laparoscopic surgery. Surgeries are performed on an emergency basis only when intestinal obstruction or perforation occurs (Diggs et al., 2007) .
Data and Sample

Data sources
The main database used is the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters file (CCE) which assembles complete insurance claims for approximately 100 large employers who self insure. We extracted claims for hospitalizations for employees and dependents with a diagnosis of colorectal cancer who underwent surgical treatment, namely colon resection. Unlike hospital discharge data which provide charges, claims databases reflect actual payments made to hospitals, namely transaction prices (see 
Colorectal surgery prices by procedure variant
The distribution of transaction prices by the variant of colorectal surgery and hospital type are shown in Figure 1 . The mean for all the procedures combined was We further compare prices between hospital types within the ownership, teaching, and system affiliation categories. Tests indicated that generally, prices in public, forprofit, and non-profit hospitals were statistically different at the 99% significance level.
However, prices in teaching and non-teaching hospitals, and system-affiliated and independent hospitals were not significantly different for any of the variants of the surgical procedure.
9 4 Analytical and Conceptual Framework
Simple theoretical insights
Although it may be natural to assume that higher quality is associated with higher prices, this may not necessarily be the case. To see this generally, let the hospital maximize 6 :
where P is price, X is output, Q is quality, and C is total cost. Price is the choice variable of interest, while Q is exogenous. The first-order condition for price is
The notation X P (P, Q) is used to denote that X P depends on P and Q.
Now consider the effect of an increase in Q on P. From the total differential of  P and the implicit function theorem
Since  PP is negative by the second-order condition for profit maximization, we have sign(dP/dQ) = sign( PQ ). Solving  PQ and rearranging we get,
The sign of the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) is positive while the signs of the last three terms are ambiguous. However, by imposing a few reasonable assumptions on the hospital's structure, it can be shown that sign(dP/dQ) depends on how quality affects the slope of the demand curve. For instance, if C XX ≥ 0 and if C XQ ≥ 0, 10 then π PQ > 0 (hence dP/dQ is positive) as long as X PQ = 0 or X PQ > 0. In the first case (X PQ = 0), quality has no effect on the slope of the demand curve. The second case (X PQ > 0) corresponds to the case where a quality improvement causes the slope of the (quantity) demand curve to be steeper 7 8 .
Empirical Estimation
4.2.a Price regressions
We model transaction prices for colon cancer surgeries adjusting for the underlying clinical traits of the procedure, patient traits, hospital and insurer characteristics, and local area market structure. The variable of greatest interest to us is the hospital performance measure. We explore two alternative specifications of this variable, the standardized mortality ratio (SMR) and the risk adjusted standardized mortality ratio (RSMR). Detailed construction of these two variables is provided in the next subsection.
We model the transaction price using a generalized linear model (GLM) with a log link and normal family (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989) . It has been common practice to model the logarithm of prices, E(ln(y|x)) = xβ but models that specify E(y|x)= exp(xβ)
are preferred for a number of reasons (Manning, 1998; Manning and Mullahy, 2001 ).
This allows us to report back-transformed coefficients without further adjustment, additionally allowing us to express the results in terms of relative price differences (see 7 Equivalently, an increase in price makes the (quantity) demand less sensitive to quality.
8 It can easily be shown that the familiar price rule for the firm can be derived from eq.
[1]. where ε is the price elasticity of demand. Here, the optimal price would not change if C X (the marginal cost of quantity) and ε are constant (do not depend on X or Q). below). Model selection criteria showed that the normal family was preferred to other suitable candidates, e.g., Poisson and Gamma. Prices were adjusted for medical inflation using the hospital component of CPI, and are expressed in 2007 levels.
Construction of several variables included in the regression model requires further explanation. Indicators of type and severity of surgery are as previously described.
Additionally, to adjust for patients' overall severity of illness and preexisting conditions in both our mortality and price models, we used the list of comorbid conditions as developed by Elixhauser et al. (1998) , to define a scale of 0, 1, 2, 3+ conditions. 9 We also control for whether the patient received colostomy procedure during the surgery.
Separately, we accounted for the presence of metastatic cancer (ICD-9 codes 196.0-199.1) 10 .
Hospital characteristics were previously described. In addition, we control for the type of benefit plan available to the employee from the self-insured employer.
Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) were the dominant form of benefit plans in our data, accounting for about 63% of all patient encounters. They formed the reference category; they were followed by other forms of fee-based plans, predominantly comprehensive fee-for-service (there was a small number of cases with consumer-9 The Elixhauser index is based on a more comprehensive set of comorbid conditions than the Charlson index, which is also widely used in the epidemiologic literature. We identified these conditions through ICD-9 diagnosis codes documented in the inpatient datasets. In exploratory side regressions, we observed no marked difference between models incorporating binary indicators of the most prevalent conditions and the summary measure reported here.
10 Cancer registry data incorporate the more detailed classification based on cancer staging, conventionally ranked on a 1-4 scale. These data however, are available for a limited number of states, and could not be matched to our data. Using claims data it was also possible to construct the binary measure of metastases, indicating cancer spread (Cooper et al., 1999; Merkow et al., 2013) .
directed health plans; these were included in the fee-based category). The next most common type of benefit plan was fee-based plans, followed by point-of-service (POS) In addition to the hospital characteristics previously described, we also included an HRR-level hospital market structure variable, namely the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) which measures market concentration in the area, defined as the sum of hospital squared market shares. We explored two ways of defining HHI. First, we counted each hospital as a separate entity. Second, in market areas with more than one hospital belonging to a particular multi-hospital system, we summed the share of hospitals within the system thereby counting them as one unit. All market shares were based on medical and surgical admissions. As expected the system based index yielded greater market concentration (Table 1) . Since both HHI variables yielded similar results, we opted to include the coefficients for the more commonly used hospital-based HHI in Tables 1 and   11 Of the 791 of surgeries classified as fee-based in our sample only 22 were covered by consumer directed health plans (CDHP). All other surgeries in this category were coded as comprehensive fee-for-service (FFS). There was no statistical difference between prices in these plans. Of the 505 surgeries covered by HMOs, only 29 were coded as EPOs in our data. were previously used as proxies for the hospital's and the insurer's bargaining power ).
While we are precluded from identifying individual hospitals and employers in these data, our analysis informs consumers and decision makers alike about the extent to which performance and the complexity of the underlying medical case contributes to the eventual pricing of a colorectal surgery.
4.2.b Hospital Performance Measures
We focus on hospital mortality, which has formed the basis of hospital level performance measures in numerous studies and in a variety of clinical settings, including that of colon resection (Hayanga et al., 2010) . In particular we consider two measures of excess mortality, namely the standardized mortality ratio (SMR) and the risk standardized mortality ratio (RSMR). The SMR is the relatively simpler measure, thus more likely to have been accessible to various group purchasers in the study period for purposes of actuarial calculations (Rothman, 2012) . On the other hand the RSMR involves more 14 complex methodology and was recently incorporated into the Hospital Compare rating system for the diagnoses of AMI and heart failure (CMS, 2012; Krumholz et al., 2005) .
We replicated the statistical approach with some modifications in risk-adjustment variables to reflect the diagnosis of colon cancer.
The SMR is defined as the ratio of "actual" mortality to "expected" mortality in the hospital. Actual mortality is calculated as the sample mortality rate for each hospital.
Expected mortality is calculated as the average of predictions from a logistic regression that adjusts for patient-level characteristics and severity measures. RSMR is the ratio of "predicted" to "expected" mortality rates in the hospital, where both the predicted mortality rate and the expected mortality rate are estimated by Hierarchical (Random effects) Logistic regression model (see Krumholz et al., 2006a Krumholz et al., , 2006b ). The hierarchical logistic regression incorporates a hospital-specific random intercept (which can be interpreted as a measure of the hospital's adverse quality) in addition to adjusting for patient characteristics. The hospital predicted mortality is calculated as the average of patient level predictions from the pooled model that take both effects of covariates and estimated random intercepts into account. Here, expected mortality is the average of predictions assuming that each hospital random intercept is zero, or in other words, holding hospital quality constant.
Further emulating the Hospital Compare methodology, we estimate predicted mortality with Medicare administrative claims data, matching hospitals from this analysis to hospitals in the main analysis file. We use 3-year moving averages of hospital-level SMR and RSMR in our regression analyses. Results Table 2 allows for a comparison of results from price regressions using our alternative definitions of hospital performance, namely the standardized mortality ratio (SMR), and the risk-standardized mortality ratio, the RSMR. While the vast majority of employers in the MarketScan data offer employees one type of benefit plan only, the data would not allow us to identify the subset of employees who were offered a choice, thus endogeneity of plan choice is a concern. To avoid confounding effects due to potential endogeneity biases in the plan variables, we estimated pairings of models, with the plan indicators included and omitted. As seen in the table, omitting these variables had no substantive effects on coefficients of all other variables, thus we focus our discussion primarily on the models with all variables included. We report cluster-robust standard errors, to adjust for within-hospital correlations for patients treated in the same hospital.
In general, coefficient estimates were qualitatively similar across specifications.
Noting that the coefficients in these semi-log models are simply the percent effect on price of a unit change in the variable, for expositional convenience we rescaled continuous variables with values between 0 and 1 (times 100); thus coefficients of the indices HMO penetration and HHI are interpreted as the effect of a percentage point change in the index on price. We further applied the adjustment e β -1 to the coefficients of binary explanatory variables in the discussion below.
As discussed earlier, the variables of greatest interest in this analysis were the measures of hospital quality as measured by SMR and RSMR. The coefficients on both measures of mortality are negative, but none of them is statistically significant. While the coefficients on SMR are very close to zero, those on RMSR are larger, and if statistically 16 significant, would indicate a substantive negative relationship between quality and price.
To show effect sizes, we changed SMR and RSMR in standard deviation units. We observe that increases by one, two, and three standard deviations of SMR corresponded to 0.36%, 0.74%, and 1.10% declines in price; the same analysis for RSMR yielded 1.19%, 2.35%, and 3.51% declines.
Among other possible determinants, there was no significant variation in prices due to age or gender (a minor exception occurred between age 50 and 60), payment differences tend to reflect illness severity and complexity of the underlying procedure significantly. While there was no difference in the price of partial surgery versus total surgery (referring to the surgical removal of part or the whole patient's colon), the price of laparoscopic surgery, a less invasive form of the procedure was 5.7-5.9% lower compared with surgery using standard incision. On the other hand, the price of surgery involving colostomy, a complex procedure that can be performed in conjunction with the main surgery, was about 26% higher than surgery alone in all model specifications.
Prices for cases involving metastases and prices of emergency surgery are also significantly higher than the baseline case, (+21% and +35% respectively). The higher price associated with emergency surgeries might be due to the fact that these cases were taken outside of insurers' network. Similar to the effect of metastases, payments increase significantly in a step-wise fashion as patient severity rises, as reflected in the Elixhauser index.
Focusing on hospital type and benefit plan characteristics, the results are generally
in line with what might be anticipated due to gradations in pricing power. Thus, prices at not-for-profit hospitals were about 10% lower relative to the default category, namely hospitals sponsored by local governments, whereas prices at for-profit hospitals were 8%
higher. Prices at teaching hospitals were 4.6-5.4% higher compared with non-teaching hospitals, and prices at system-owned hospitals slightly lower compared with nonteaching and non-system hospitals, but statistically significant. Similarly, price differences associated with type of benefit plan are as anticipated, with prices at feebased plans and point-of-service plans slightly higher than prices at the default category (PPOs), while prices lower in closed-HMO plans; however none of these price differences were statistically significant.
Turning next to market structure, we find that HMO penetration is highly significant, and exerts moderate downward pressure on prices. We interpret the results in Table 2 to mean that a one percentage point increase, relative to a mean HMO penetration rate of 10.9 on the 0-100 scale, is associated with a 0.004% reduction in price, or $87;
equivalently, a 10% increase in the penetration rate leads to a $81 decrease in price, implying an elasticity =-0.04. We also find that hospital market concentration as measured by HHI tends to increase prices although the related coefficients were not statistically significant. However, we note that the HHI variables pertain to all inpatient admissions in the hospital and may not accurately reflect pricing power in the cancer segment of the market; cancer-specific market shares were not available in our data.
13 13 We also explored system-based HHIs, whereby two or more hospitals located in a given market area and belonging to the same multi-hospital system are counted as a single entity (by summing their market shares). As expected, this resulted in more concentrated markets (the mean HHI was 0.201 compared with 0.142 for the hospital-based HHI), but with no improvement is statistical significance in our price models
Summary and Implications
Previous literature on hospital markets and pricing tended to focus on cardiac procedures or diagnoses. In this study we focus on the lesser explored case of colorectal cancer, a leading cause of death among all cancers, and its surgical treatments. In particular we explore transaction prices paid by benefit plans administered by large employers. While there were no significant differences by plan types administered this way, our analysis revealed a rational pricing structure, with price difference matching gradients in severity and complexity of the main surgical procedure and its variants.
The effects of greatest interest were those of the standardized mortality ratio (SMR) and the risk-standardized mortality ratio (RSMR), which are based on methodologies that are now standard under the federal Hospital Compare and other public reporting systems. Although measures focused particularly on cancer diagnoses are rarely included in such rankings, they are potentially accessible to large group purchasers that characterize our data. For both of the mortality measures studied, namely the SMR and the RSMR we found negative effects on price (adverse quality reduces price) which were consistent in all model specifications; however, the results were not significant. One possible explanation for this weak effect is that purchasers are not able to replicate quality scores for purposes of price negotiations. Another explanation is that such scores are accessible, but underlying demand for cancer treatment is not highly sensitive to quality differences among providers 14 . We are unable to distinguish between these explanations, and leave this for future exploration. Finally, we find high correlation between the SMR and RSMR (e.g. Figure A .1), suggesting that simply adding hospital Figure A-1 . In practice, all of the models yield close results. There appears to be some fluctuations of 30-day mortality rates from between years, but all bends occur within a tight range around the mean. Elixhauser score is a summary measure of the presence of other diagnoses or comorbidities. The odds-ratios for risk adjusters in the two models were virtually identical. The results clearly indicate increases in mortality rates as patient severity increases (metastases, number of comorbidities), along with a 7% increase due to additional year of, and a 34% differential for males relative to females.
variables interacted with the binary year indicators were not jointly significant, χ 2 (54)=51.37, p = 0.3433. 19 Under Hospital Compare, hospitals with less than 21 cases were retained in the data, but assigned the (national) sample mean characteristics. Rather than lumping together all small hospitals in each with relatively rare occurrences of colorectal surgeries, we opted to exclude such hospitals from our mortality regressions. For sampling units with < 21 parametric methods for calculating standard errors do not apply (Kahn and Sempos, 1989) . 20 ICD-9 codes for metastatic disease are: 196.0, 196.1, 196.3-196.5, 196.7-196.9, 197.0-197.4, 197.6-199.0 ; ICD-9 codes for emergency surgery were: intestinal obstruction (560.8, 560.9), peritonitis (567.0, 567.2) and perforation (569.83). See Cooper et al., 1999, and Merkow et al., 2013. 
30
The Hospital Compare web site further explains that mortality rankings are based on aggregating mortality for three years ending with the reference year. To emulate this aspect, we construct three-year moving averages of SMR and RSMR, and we incorporate the transformed values into our price regressions. Three year averaging has the added advantage of smoothing random temporal shocks. The price regressions in Tables 2-3 include SMR and RSMR as described above, namely with the averaging for years t, t-1, t-2 in the hospital matched to prices in year t 21 . Source: Authors' analysis of MEDPAR files.
